银行风险管理论文文献参考

关于商业银行信贷风险管理的研究论文从经济风险及银行信贷风险管理的一般理论出发，阐明经济风险是现代市场经济的基本特征之一，而银行信贷风险是整个经济风险的集中反映。风险的本质在于收益与损失的可能性并存，因而对经济主体有激励效应与约束效应。商业银行经营的本质就是在风险的这种双重效应的制衡下，回避与防范风险，使风险降到自身可接受的程度，同时获取尽可能大的利润。由于信贷业务在银行经营及经济运行中的重要地位，银行的信贷风险控制就具有了特别重要的意义。目前，西文经济学界运用信息不对称理论，对银行信贷风险产生的原因， 已取得共识，即信息不对称下的逆选择和道德风险以及信息不完全的客观风险。文章还讨论了信贷风险管理与商业银行资产负债比例管理、资本充足率管理、内部控制的关系；并澄清了信贷风险管理认识上的一些误区。以上内容构成了本文的第一章。 文章的第二章首先比较了各种外部组织形式与风险管理效率的关系，指出外部组织形式并非影响信贷管理效率的决定性因素，而内部组织结构才是其中的关键因素。设计信贷风险管理组织结构的重点在于形成各部门之间的横向牵制和各级分支机构的纵向控制机制。西方商业银行经过长期经营发展，内部组织结构逐渐固化为三大功能块：市场块、操作块、管理块，分别行使市场开拓、业务操作、集中管理的职能，三者相互牵制、相互配合。这种组织设计思想体现在信贷业务上，就是审、贷、查三程序在组织结构上的彻底分离，即公司业务部、信贷评审部、风险管理部分别实施贷前调查、贷中审查、贷后检查职能，并且三个部门分别属于不同功能块，以此实现部门间的横向牵制。纵向控制主要是通过贷款决策权在上、下级机构之间进行分配实现的，即对集权型决策与分权型决策的选择；同时也包括在同一机构内，贷款决策权在个人与集体之间的分配，即对个人决策权与集体决策权的选择。文章用运组织管理学的基本原理，详细讨论了这两组共四种决策体制的优劣，指出单纯使用上述任何一种决策机制都存在明显的缺陷，因此现代商业银行都倾向于将集体决策与个人决策、集权型与分权型结合起来，采取以个人决策及分权为主的贷款审批授权制度。这是实行贷款审批授权制度的理论依据。 本文的第三章着重讨论了信贷风险管理的制度系统及其执行效率。组织控制理论认为，制度是保证组织功能优化及发挥、组织机构稳定的必要条件，因此信贷风险管理的一个根本前提是制定并执行严格科学的管理制度，把信贷风险的控制建立在制度保证的基础上。本章首先结合我国的实际情况，介绍了基准制度——信贷政策，指出我国各商业银行应尽快建立统一、完备的信贷政策，正确划分目标市场区域，确定统一的信贷标准和贷款发放原则，以充分发挥整体竞争实力，降低贷款风险。接着，文章用巴黎国际银行和加拿大皇家银行的实例说明了如何设计相互制约的信贷程序，并讨论了实施审、贷、查三分离制度的意义及原因。其次，引用招商银行的成功范例——弹性授权制阐释了贷款决策授权的原则及审批权限划分标准的确定。在第五节“贷款风险损失责任制”中，笔者提出了一种新的责任追查顺序，即反信贷程序的责任追查顺序，以加强各部门、各环节的相互制约，降低经营风险。本章还详细介绍了贷款风险管理的稽核与评价制度的程序与内容，指出内部稽核的权威性、独立性是保证制度系统有效的一个重要因素。在本章的最后，讨论了信贷风险管理的制度效率与银行经营观念的关系，指出，彻底转变经营观念，注重经营的稳健性和利润的长期性是提高我国银行信贷管理水平的当务之急。 信贷风险管理的技术与方法是信贷风险管理中的技术因素，科学有效的决策技术、信息传输系统是现代信贷风险管理的物质基础。我国信贷风险管理的薄弱点之一就是管理技术与方法的落后，因此本文第四章的主要目的就是通过介绍西方商业银行成熟的管理技术，为提高我国信贷风险管理技术提供一些借鉴。文章着重介绍了信贷风险的主要诱因----过度融资的技术分析方法，并提出了信用限额在实际业务中的测算与分析方法，围绕借款人信用可靠性、违约可能性的评估技术和经营状况变化及破产的介绍了工商贷款资信评分模型、消费信贷的资信评分模型等。在信贷风险管理信息系统中，着重讨论了运用信贷管理信息系统的意义、信贷管理信息系统的设计思想及维护其有效性的措施。最后，本章介绍了信贷风险挽救技术与策略，指出成立专门的风险挽救机构是化解我国巨额不良信贷资产的措施之一。 在第五章中，笔者提出信贷风险管理的核心是对人员的激励与控制的观点。现代管理理论认为一切管理归根结底是对人的管理，对人的行为的管理。信贷风险管理作为一种具体管理，其本质也是对人的管理。在信贷风险管理的四个子系统中，对人员的激励与控制系统居于支配地位，其它三个子系统直接或间接地为管理信贷人员服务。在对人的管理以孰为本的问题上，制度主义与行为主义基于对人性的不同假定，两者观点截然不同。前者强调制度、控制的作用，后者强调人的能动性，认为管理的重点在于从正面诱导员工的积极性、主动性。The thesis sets out from the general theories of economic risks and banking credit risks management, to represent that economic risks are one of basic characters of modern market economy, and the banking credit risks are the focalization of the whole economic risks. The essence of risk is that the possibilities of proceeds and losses exist simultaneously, therefore encouraging meanwhile restricting the activities of main body of the market economy. The essence of commercial banks is to avoid and prevent risks under the balance of dual effects of the risk so that risks can decline to an acceptable degree while proceeds is to be taken in as much as possible. At present, western economic industry has reached a consensus on the reasons of the exposure of banking credit risks by virtue of the information non-symmetry theory that risks stem from the adverse selection under the information non-symmetry and moral risks and objective risks arising from information insufficiency. In addition, this thesis discusses the relations between credit risks management and equity-debt ratio management, capital abundance ratio management and internal control respectively. It also clarifies some misunderstanding on credit risks management. The above-mentioned contents form Chapter One of this thesis. Chapter Two of this thesis first points out that the decisive factor of the efficiency of credit management is not the external organizational form but internal organization structure by comparing the relations between various external organizational forms and the efficiency of risks management. The emphases on designing organizational structure of credit risks management should be laid on the forming of the mechanism of lateral control between different divisions and the mechanism of vertical control on different levels of subsidiaries and affiliates. After long-term development, the internal organizational structure of western commercial banks has been shaped into three functional sections: market section, operation section and administration section, which exercise the functions of marketing, business operation, and centralized administration respectively, and furthermore, control one another, cooperate one another. This kind of idea about organizational design is embodied by the complete organizational division of these three steps of credit examination, approval and investigation in the credit operation that means the departments of business operation, credit examination and risk management, which belong to three different functional sections, respectively perform the functions of research before loan-providing, examination of credit application, and supervision after loan-providing, thereby, the lateral control between different departments can be effected. The vertical control is exercised through both the allotment of credit decision-making power between higher levels and lower levels of business departments that means to choose centralization or decentralization of power, and allotment of credit decision-making power between individuals and collectivity in a department that represents individual or collective decision-making power. This thesis amply discusses the good and bad effect of these four kinds of decision-making systems under two groups by applying the fundamentals of organizational management, thereby indicating that solely using any one of four decision-making systems will bring on visible defects. Accordingly, modern commercial banks mostly intends to adopt the loan examining authorization system which joins the collective and individual decision-making as well as centralization and decentralization together, but giving priority to individual decision and decentralization of power. Chapter Three of this thesis puts emphases on credit risks management system and its executive efficiency. The organizational control theory deems that system is the necessary condition under which organizational functions can be optimized and exerted, meanwhile organizational institution being stabilized,(美)卡尔-约翰·林捷瑞恩(Carl-JohanLindgren)等著; 潘康等译; 银行稳健经营与宏观经济政策[M]. 中国金融出版社, 1997