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THIS WAS supposed to be the quarter that Kraft Heinz showed America's huge, struggling food companies a new model for success. A merger in 2015 had joined two of the world's most iconic food makers. Backed by 3G Capital, a private-equity firm, the new group slashed costs at a pace that made rivals shudder and investors swoon. After a failed bid in 2017 for Unilever, an Anglo-Dutch giant, Kraft Heinz set out to prove it could not just cut fat but boost sales on its own. Bernardo Hees, the company's boss, pointed cheerfully to new products, including Heinz Mayochup and something called Just Crack an Egg. The company was on the path to "sustainable, profitable growth", he declared in November. Unfortunately, it wasn't.  On February 21st Kraft Heinz announced a staggering $15bn impairment, a dividend cut of more than 3o% and an inquiry into its procurement by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Earnings calls are often sleepy affairs. This one was a nightmare. Some of 3G's long-time critics are now clucking with satisfaction. Others fear 3G is tarnishing American treasures such as Kraft Macaroni and Cheese and Warren Buffett, who partnered with 3G to combine Heinz and Kraft and last year lost nearly $3bn on the deal. Yet dramatic as Kraft Heinz's decline may seem, 3G's impact and the food industry's problems extend far beyond it.  While its founders are Brazilian, 3G's buyout business is based in Manhattan.(Its most famous founder, Jorge Paulo Lemann, lives in Switzerland.) Unlike many big private-equity firms, 3G's main investors are not pension funds but family offices and individuals, including its partners. It does not have a wide portfolio, but backs just two companies: Kraft Heinz and Restaurant Brands International (RBI). Blackstone, a private-equity firm based a few blocks away, has nearly 2,5oo 's New York office has fewer than two dozen. Yet 3G's leaders have rocked the consumer industry like few investors in history.  All buyout firms are thirsty for deals, but 3G is uniquely parched. Before starting 3G, the firm's founders went on a beer-buying spree that culminated in 2o16 with Anheuser-Busch InBev's purchase of SAB Miller for more than $100bn. AB InBev, in which 3G's partners have a large stake, now brews more than one in four of the world's beers. Kraft Heinz counts Kraft cheese, Heinz Ketchup, Jell-0, Philadelphia Cream Cheese and Oscar Mayer among its holdings. RBI includes Burger King, Popeyes, a fried-chicken restaurant, and Tim Hortons, a popular Canadian chain. The way 3G runs companies is as notable as its appetite for buying them. In a practice called zero-based budgeting, managers must justify their expenses anew each year. The idea is to expand margins continuously. Overseeing this are managers chosen for their talent and work ethic, rather than mere experience. Daniel Schwartz, a 3G partner, became the chief executive of Burger King at 32. Mr Hees, a 3G partner who spent more than a decade working for a Latin American railroad, became Kraft Heinz's boss at 45. David Knopf, its chief financial officer, assumed his position in 2017 at 29.  To 3G's detractors, this all seems a bit mad. The company's strategy can be caricatured as follows: buy a big business, cut costs, repeat. This is not entirely fair. RBI has invested in marketing Burger King, winning prizes for its ads. AB InBev is working to boost its sales, for instance by pushing  higher-priced beers and deploying best practices across its vast geography.  But buying big companies and slashing costs remain 3G's speciality. The risks of that strategy have become clear. RBI struggled to integrate franchisees at Tim Hortons. AB InBev last year said it would slash its dividend by half.  Nowhere has 3G's approach played out more tumultuously than at Kraft Heinz. America's food industry seemed the perfect target, with flabby companies and powerful brands. Rare is the American who has not slurped Kool-Aid or downed an Oscar Mayer hot dog smothered in Heinz reckoned the brands were strong enough to withstand large cuts. As it turns out, they were not.  This was not the same for AB InBev, which despite abysmal results in America, has little beer competition from in-store brands, is rarely sold online and faces ample growth abroad. Kraft Heinz's business, by comparison, is concentrated in America, where the food industry is being turned on its head. Its brands may be familiar, but that does not make them popular. Small firms are offering healthier options, taking advantage of cheap digital marketing and nimble contract manufacturers. The smallest 20,000 packaged goods players account for about half the industry's growth, according to Nielsen, a research firm.  Meanwhile, the rise of e-commerce and European discount grocers has put pressure on food retailers, which are in turn squeezing food companies. Stores led by Walmart are using extensive data to launch their own, increasingly sophisticated, low-cost private label goods, all the while pushing companies to lower their prices.  Things started well for Kraft Heinz. Its operating profit margin surged from 15% in 2014 to 24% in 2017. The first big setback came that year when Paul Polman, then Unilever's boss, rebuffed the company's $143bn courtship.(Unilever, wisely, has devoted growing attention not to food but to beauty and household products.) Without his megadeal, Mr Hees turned to the basic work of lifting sales by pouring more money into advertising, product innovation and Kraft Heinz's sales force, but that ate into profits.  Equally striking is the company's new $15bn impairment, a recognition that the value of giant brands has shrivelled. Mr Buffett says that he misjudged the worth of Kraft's stable of products. "The management team entered into this merger with the assumption they could cut the spending needed to maintain brands, let alone help them grow," says Robert Moskow of Credit Suisse, a bank. "The world changed on them-retailers changed and consumers changed." Flawed though 3G's approach may seem, few food companies offer a successful alternative. Companies have tried to evolve by buying smaller firms, often at lofty prices and with mixed results. For instance Campbell Soup bought Bolthouse Farms, a maker of fruity drinks, in 2o12, but is now trying to sell it. Last year it bought Snyder's-Lance, a pretzel and popcorn company, to boost its snacks business. Its debt level has risen accordingly. Indeed, shopping sprees at Campbell, ConAgra and General Mills have made those companies more levered than Kraft Heinz, according to Sanford C Bernstein, a research firm.  Kraft Heinz now wants to shrink to grow: it plans divestments over the next 18 months to improve its balance sheet so it can make other, big deals. But the SEC's subpoena suggests that some internal processes might be unravelling as managers struggle to meet bold goals. The notion that big deals will save American food firms looks increasingly dubious. In 2014, before Heinz bought Kraft, the combined gross operating profits of the companies were about $. Now, due in part to some problems beyond its control, Kraft Heinz expects its 2019 profits to be about the same.卡夫亨氏《Kraft Heinz）本应在这个季度向美国规模巨大但陷入困境的食品公司展示一种通往成功的新模式。2015年，两家全球最具标志性的食品制造商合二为一。在私募股权公司G资本的支持下，新集团以令竞争对手战栗、令投资者狂喜的速度削减成本。2017年收购英荷巨头联合利华失败后，卡夫亨氏开始想办法证明自己不但会减肥，还能凭自身提高销焦额。公司老板贝尔纳多·希斯（Bernardo Hees）兴高采烈地搬出新产品作例证，包括亨氏的蛋黄番茄酱（Mayochup）和一种叫“打个蛋”（just Crack an Egg）的食品。去年11月他查布公司正走在遇往可持续、有盈利的增长“的道路上。遗憾的是，并没有。 上月21日，卡夫亨氏披露了150亿美元的巨额减记、削减超过30%的股息，以及美国证券交易委员会（SEC）调查其采购部门的事宜。财报电话会议通常让人昏昏欲题，这一次却是一场露梦。一些长期批评3G资本的人现在难掩得意之情。另一些人则担心，3G资本正在玷污像卡夫亨氏通心粉和巴菲特这样的美国瑰宝。之前正是巴非特与3G资本联手促成了亨氏和卡夫的合井，去年他因这笔交易亏损近30亿美元。不过，尽管卡夫亨氏的业绩下滑看起来很惊人，3G资本的影响和食品行业的问题却远不止于此。 3G资本的几位创始人都是巴西人，但收购业务的总部设在曼哈顿。（公司最知名的创始人豪尔赫·保罗·雷曼[Jorge Paulo Lemann]住在瑞士。）与许多大型私募股权公司不同，3G资本的主要投资者不是养老基金，而是家族办公空和个人，包括它的合伙人。它的投资组合并不广泛，只支持两家公司：卡夫亨氏和国际餐饮品牌公司（Restaurant Brands International，RBJ）。私募股权公司需石（Blackstone）的总卸离3G资本只有几个街区，有近2500名员工，而3G资本纽约办事处的员工还不到24人。不过，3G贸本的领导者却震憾了整个消费行业，极少有投资者曾做到这一点。 所有的投资收购公司都渴望达成交易，但3G资本在这方面的热望独一无二。在成立3G资本之前，该公司的创始人掀起了一场啤酒业收购狂湖，在2016年百威英博（Anheuser-Busch InBev）以逾1000亿美元收购SAB米勒（SAB Miller）时达到顶峰。如今，由G资本的合伙人大量持股的百威英博酿造了超过全球四分之一的啤酒。卡夫亨氏的产品包括卡夫奶酪、亨氏番茄、Jell-O果冻、菲力奶油奶酪和Oscar Mayer肉制品。RBI旗下有汉堡王、炸鸡店Popeyes和颇受欢迎的加拿大连锁店Tim Hortons。 3G资本运营所持有公司的方式和收购它们的劲头一样引人注目。它采用一种“零基预算法”的做法，经理们每年都要重新证明他们的支出是合理的。此举是为了持续扩大利润率。而监督这一操作的管理层是因他们的才能和职业道德而不仅仅是经验被选定的。3G资本的合伙人之一丹尼尔·施瓦茨（Daniel Schwartz）出任汉堡王的首席执行官时才32岁。另一位合伙人希斯在一家拉美铁路公司工作了十多年，45岁时成为卡夫亨氏的老板。首席财务官戴维·克诺夫（David Knopf）2017年上任时才29岁。 对于3G资本的抨击者来说，这一切似乎有点疯狂。夸张一点说，该公司的战略就是：收购一家大企业，削减成本，然后再重复。但这么说并不完全公平。RBI在汉堡王的营销上投资，赢得了广告大奖。百威英博正努力提振销售，比如推销价格更高的啤酒，并在公司广阔的版图上应用最佳实践。 但收购大公司和削减成本仍是3G资本的专长。这种策略的风险已经变得很明显。整合Tim Hortons的加盟商让RBI不堪重负。百威英博去年表示将把股息削减一半。 3G资本的这套做法用在卡夫亨氏上时表现得最为混乱。美国的食品产业看起来是个完美的目标，因为该行业里企业臃肿但品牌强大。很少有美国人没喝过速溶饮料Kool-Aid，或是没吃过涂满亨氏番茄酱的Oscar Mayer热狗。3G资本认为这些品牌足够强大，能承受大幅成本削减。事实证明它们并不能。 百威英博的情况就不一样了。尽管在美国的业绩糟糕透顶，但百威英博几乎没有遇到过来自商店自有品牌啤酒的竞争，很少在网上销售，而且海外增长强劲。相比之下，卡夫亨氏的业务集中在美国，而美国的食品行业正在发生翻天覆地的变化。它的各个品牌可能为人熟知，但这并不能让它们大卖。小公司正利用便宜的数字营销和灵活的承包生产商带来的优势，提供给消费者更健康的选择。根据研究公司尼尔森的数据，规模最小的两万家包装食品公司占了整个行业增长的一半左右。 与此同时，电子商务和欧洲折扣杂货商的崛起给食品零售商带来了压力，它们继而又向食品公司施压。以沃尔玛为首的商店正在利用大量数据推出越来越精致且价格低廉的自有品牌商品，并始终在促使食品公司降价。 卡夫亨氏的开局不错。营业利润率从2014年的15%飙升至2017年的24%。2017年，卡夫亨氏遭遇了第一次重大挫折，时任联合利华老板的保罗.波尔曼（Paul Polman）拒绝了该公司1430亿美元的求购。（联合利华明智地将注意力越来越多地放在美容和家用品而非食品上。）巨额收购计划落空，希斯转而专注于提高销售额这项基础工作，将更多资金投在广告、产品创新和卡夫亨氏的销售队伍上，但这侵蚀了利润。 同样惹人注目的是该公司150亿美元的新一轮减记，这等于承认公司各大品牌价值缩水。巴菲特表示他错误地判断了卡夫众多产品的价值。“管理团队设想的是，合并之后他们可以削减品牌维护所必需的开支，更不用说帮助品牌成长了，”瑞信银行的罗伯特·莫斯可（Robert Moskow）说道，“世界在他们那里发生了变化——零售商变了，消费者也变了。” 3G资本的方法似乎存在缺陷，但极少有食品公司能拿出一个成功的替代方案。各大公司尝试通过收购规模较小的公司来自我进化，这些收购交易的价格往往很高，而收效不一。例如，金宝汤（Campbell Soup）于2012年收购了果汁饮料生产商Bolthouse Farms，但现在又想把它卖掉。去年它收购了一家椒盐脆饼和爆米花公司Snyder's-Lance，以扩大零食业务。它的债务水平也相应上升。研究公司盛博称，实际上，金宝汤、康尼格拉（ConAgra）和通用磨坊（General Mills）的疯狂收购使得这些公司的杠杆率比卡夫亨氏还高。 卡夫亨氏现在希望通过收缩规模来实现增长：它计划在未来18个月剥离资产以改善资产负债表，以便能实现其他大规模交易。但美国证交会的传票显示，由于管理层难以达到大胆的目标，一些内部流程可能正在瓦解。大型交易能拯救美国食品公司的想法看起来越来越不可靠了。2014年在亨氏收购卡夫之前，两家公司的总营业利润约为65亿美元。现在，一定程度上由于公司自身无法控制的一些问题，卡夫亨氏预计2019年的利润将与合并前大致相同。

原文出处： The Economist, Business, New York, Apr. 20th 2017. Recreational Vehicles:On the road 房车：在路上 An all-American product finds new takers. 美国产品找到新买家。 Early spring is the main selling season for recreational vehicles (RVs) and the phone on Tom Troiano's desk has been ringing incessantly. The owner of Continental RV, a dealership in Farmingdale, a village on Long Island, Mr Troiano is on track to sell more RVs this year than in any other since the early 2000s. Buoyed by cheap financing, rising wages and inexpensive gas, travellers are once again splurging on big-ticket camper vans. 早春是房车销售的黄金季，Tom Troiano桌上的电话一直响个不停。Tom Troiano是长岛法明代尔村房车经销店大陆房车(Continental RV)的老板，该店销售状况很好，预计今年销售额将达到2000年初以来的最高水平。贷款利率低，工资上涨，油价低廉，驴友们再次疯狂了，不惜撒上大把钞票购买房车。 RVs are a quintessentially American invention: more than two-thirds are made in the United States. Nationally, sales surged to 430,000 units last year, a 40-year high. At the inexpensive end they sell for as little as $5,000 for a caravan; deluxe versions cost up to $1m and are typically equipped with a bedroom, kitchen and bathroom that are bigger than in many European flats. The share prices of Thor Industries, the biggest RV-manufacturer in America, and Winnebago, the third-largest, have risen by 43% and 17%, respectively, in the past year. 房车是典型的美国发明：世界上三分之二以上的房车都产在美国。去年全美销量飙升至43万辆，达到40年来最高水平。低端产品如旅行拖车，售价只在5000美元；豪华车型价格高达100万，一般有一个卧室、一个厨房、一个卫生间，比欧洲许多公寓房还大。去年，美国最大房车生产商霍尔工业和第三大生产商温内巴戈股价分别上涨43%和17%。 That is a big  the 2008-09 recession, notes Mr Troiano, RV dealerships everywhere closed down, leaving his shop among the very few left serving the New York metropolitan area. The current rebound is mostly owing to the economy's recovery, but it also springs from the fact that new types of customer are embracing the lifestyle. 真是形势剧变。Troiano指出，08-09年经济衰退，各处房车经销商纷纷倒闭，像他这样仍坚持在纽约大都市区经营的经销商没有几家。眼下销售回暖主要是经济复苏的结果，同时，有新的客户群开始崇尚这种生活方式，也是销售反弹的一个原因。 A decade ago the average age of an RV-owner was 49, and over 90% were white, says Kevin Broom of the Recreational Vehicle Industry Association (RVIA), an industry body. That didn't bode well for the future. But stereotypes are being dented. Anecdotal reports suggest that ethnic minorities now make up around asixth of all new customers, says Mr Broom. The fastest-growing customer demographic is 35- to 44-year-olds. Another boost comes from affluent immigrants, who are keen to experience long, self-planned road trips in America. Mr Troiano's most recent big sale was to a rich Asian family. 房车行业协会（RVIA）的Kevin Broom表示：十年前，房车车主平均年龄在49岁，白人占90%以上。这样的结构对于未来而言不是好事，不过人们眼中过去的情况正在逐渐发生改观。Broom先生说，一些非正式报告显示：少数族裔已经占到新客户总数的六分之一左右。增长最快的客户群体是35-44岁之间的人士。另一个迅速增长的群体是经济状况良好的移民，这些人非常渴望亲身体验美国的长途自由行。Troiano先生最近的一大单就来自于一个富裕的亚裔家庭。 The industry hopes that its poor record with foreign sales—last year less than 1% of RVs produced domestically were shipped to foreign markets (excluding Canada)—may improve, 's government, for example, has pledged to build 2,000 campgrounds by 2020, up from an estimated 300 today, in a bid to promote domestic tourism, particularly to remote rural regions. Chinese firms such as Yutong Bus make RVs, but not of the quality that many Chinese want. The country imported 1,000 vehicles last year, over half of them American. 去年，国产房车出口海外市场（不包括加拿大）的比例还不到1%，面对海外销售的惨淡经营，业内希望今年出口销量也能有所增加。例如，中国政府承诺到2020年将建成2000个露营地，而目前这一数字估计只有300左右。此举旨在促进国内旅游业的发展，尤其是偏远农村地区的发展。宇通客车等中国企业也生产房车，但质量达不到许多中国人的要求。去年中国进口房车1000辆，一半以上为美国制造。 RV manufacturers are also marketing the notion that their motor homes can be commercial as well as leisure can allow travelling salesmen, businessmen and university-admissions officers to save onfood and hotel costs, for example, when they hit the road trying to recruit prospective new clients and students. The office, as well as home, can be wherever you park it. 房车制造商同时也在推销一种理念，即房车既可用于商业用途，也可用作休闲车辆。比如说，销售人员和商务人士出差寻找潜在客户，大学招生负责人外出招生，这时使用房车就能省下食宿费用。只消停下车来，处处办公处处家。

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